Sobre el Colapso de las Estructuras Físicas y Matemáticas en el Realismo Estructural Óntico

Cristian Soto


La sección 1 introduce lo que llamo la tesis del colapso de las estructuras matemáticas y las estructuras físicas. La sección 2 examina si acaso la indispensabilidad de las matemáticas para la física fundamental involucra la adopción del platonismo matemático, en este caso acerca de estructuras matemáticas, como argumenta el realismo estructural óntico. La sección 3 muestra que la adopción de la tesis del colapso arriesga introducir la hipótesis del universo matemático. Desde la perspectiva de la concepción inferencial en filosofía de las matemáticas aplicadas, la sección 4 examina aspectos epistémicos del rol de las matemáticas en la teorización científica, derivando distinciones entre estructuras matemáticas y estructuras físicas. El argumento concluye en la sección 5 indicando algunos límites para la presente estrategia.

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