Sobre la relación entre los Realismos Científico, Modal y Nomológico | Borge | Kriterion: Revista de Filosofia

Sobre la relación entre los Realismos Científico, Modal y Nomológico

Bruno Borge

Resumo


: Los debates en torno al Realismo Científico (RC) no sólo han tenido un inicio y desarrollo contemporáneos a los del Realismo Modal (RM) y el Realismo Nomológico (RN), sus temáticas han estado además profundamente imbricadas. Una cierta actitud realista respecto de las teorías científicas frecuentemente ha estado acompañada por la adopción de compromisos con la modalidad objetiva y las leyes naturales. Sin embargo, las relaciones entre estas tres posiciones ha sido poco exploradas. En el presente trabajo sostengo que defender el RC implica indirectamente asumir compromisos con el RM y el RN. En el primer caso, en razón de los argumentos que sostienen el RC, en el segundo, en virtud de que, dentro de las alternativas disponibles en el debate acerca de las leyes, el RN es comparativamente preferible para el realista científico.


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