Epistemología Craiguiana y el Rol de las Intuiciones en el Teorizar Epistemológico | De Brasi | Kriterion: Revista de Filosofia

Epistemología Craiguiana y el Rol de las Intuiciones en el Teorizar Epistemológico

Leandro De Brasi

Resumo


The use of intuitions as evidence is ubiquitous in epistemology, but not in the least controversial. For more than a decade and a half, some experimental epistemologists have questioned this appeal to epistemic intuitions. These philosophers exploit the methods of experimental psychology, in particular survey methods, to test how widely shared are some intuitions. Given their commitment to the relevance of empirical research to the construction of philosophical theories, these philosophers qualify as methodological naturalists. But some methodological naturalists who also recommend giving up that intuition appeal as evidence do not base their case on polls. In this article I consider two fundamental challenges to standard practice to appeal to the intuitions that these naturalistic philosophers raise and argue that an epistemological project inspired by the work of Edward Craig allows, in principle, the epistemologist who shares that methodological naturalism to deal with them . However, I conclude that, irrespective of the success of the Craiguian approach, intuitions have a role to play in epistemological theorizing in relation to adjudication between approaches. 


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